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CIVIL PROCEDURE-New Mexico Adopts the Modem View of
Collateral Estoppel: Silva v. State

I. INTRODUCTION
In Silva v. State,' the New Mexico Supreme Court adopted the modem view
of collateral estoppel. 2 Collateral estoppel precludes parties from relitigating
certain issues which were actually litigated and necessarily decided in a prior
suit.' The court in Silva rejected the traditional collateral estoppel rule that both
parties in the second suit must be the same or in privity with the opposing parties
in the prior suit.' After Silva, it is enough-absent special circumstances--that
the party against whom collateral estoppel is being asserted had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the particular issue in the prior suit.6 This casenote examines the Silva decision and discusses the background, requirements and implications of the modem collateral estoppel rule.

II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The Lower Courts and the PriorSuit
Silva was a wrongful death action resulting from Manuel Silva's hanging
himself while incarcerated at a state Corrections Department facility.7 The complaint alleged that negligent failure to provide the special care known to be
needed by Silva was the cause of his suicide.' Plaintiffs moved for partial
summary judgment on the issue of defendants' 9 liability, relying on alternative
theories of res judicata and collateral estoppel.' 0
I. 106 N.M. 472, 745 P.2d 380 (1987). Justice Ransom delivered the opinion of the court, joined by
Justices Sosa and Walters, with Chief Justice Scarborough and Justice Stowers dissenting.
2. The Silva case is significant not only for its adoption of the modem collateral estoppel rule. Also
important is its holding that the tort doctrine of respondeat superior applies under New Mexico's Tort
Claims Act so that a direct action lies against the state and its entities when an employee acting within the
scope of duties commits a tort for which immunity is waived under the Act. This note, however, will focus
exclusively on the collateral estoppel issue.
3. 106 N.M. at 474, 745 P.2d at 382.
4. Id. at 474-76, 745 P.2d at 382-84.
5. Circumstances of a given case may be such that applying modem collateral estoppel would be unfair
to the party against whom it is asserted. In these situations, judges have discretionary powers to refuse to
apply collateral estoppel. See infra nn. 81-104 and accompanying text.
6. 106 N.M. at 476, 745 P.2d at 384.
7. Id. at 473, 745 P.2d at 381.
8. Id. Silva was held at a facility where he could be medically treated for known psychiatric problems
requiring special care to prevent his suicide. Id.
9. The defendants included various health care providers and law enforcement officers, the Secretary of
Corrections, the Corrections Department, and the State. Id.
10. Id.
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The basis of plaintiffs' motion was an order entered by the federal district
court of New Mexico in the ongoing class action Duran v. Anaya. " The federal
court, relying on unchallenged findings of a special master after hearings on the
circumstances of Silva's suicide, found that the Secretary of Corrections and
other state employees failed to comply with the standards of a consent decree
which had been entered in Duran for the benefit of a class of inmates to which
Silva belonged.' 2
The state district court denied plaintiffs' partial summary judgment motion,3
and on interlocutory appeal the court of appeals affirmed the trial court ruling.
The New Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorarito review, inter alia, the
affirmance. 4
B. The Supreme Court's Holding and Important Dicta
The Silva court, after summarily rejecting the res judicata portion of the
appeal,'" appropriately centered its discussion on the collateral estoppel issue.
In the final analysis, the court affirmed the lower courts' decision not to apply
I1. 642 F. Supp. 510 (D.N.M. 1986). The Duran class brought an action complaining that various New
First Amended Complaint
Mexico penitentiary conditions fell "'beneath standards of human decency ....
dated July 6, 1978. The Complaint alleged violations of seven federal constitution amendments and included
pendent claims for relief based on state constitutional and statutory law. Id. After extensive proceedings
the parties presented the court with a comprehensive settlement containing a broad range of mandatory
injunctions, and the court entered a consent decree order on July 14, 1980. Since that time the litigation
has persisted with a steady flow of recurrent allegations and remedial orders. In 1983 the court appointed
a special master and deputy pursuant to Rule 53, Fed. R. Civ. P., to monitor compliance. The special
master has conducted hearings and filed voluminous reports containing findings of fact approved by numerous
orders of the court.
In an interesting recent development, the defendants moved to vacate portions of the consent decree,
arguing that the eleventh amendment and principles of comity require the elimination of all remedial
provisions which do not seek to enforce federal rights. The defendants' motion-which relied heavily on
the holding in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), that a federal court
may not award injunctive relief against state officials on the basis of state law-was emphatically rejected
by Judge Burciaga. Memorandum Opinion and Order dated February 11, 1988. Burciaga basically found
that since jurisdiction over the federal and state claims was proper under both the Ex Parte Young fiction
and the pendent jurisdiction doctrine, and since the decree was consensual in nature, the Pennhurst eleventh
amendment limitation on federal remedial power was inapplicable and principles of comity, if anything,
militated in favor of granting the relief which the defendants themselves, albeit under a different gubernatorial
administration, helped to fashion. Id. The decision at this writing is on interlocutory appeal to the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals.
12. Silva, 106 N.M. at 473, 745 P.2d at 381.
13. Silva, 106 N.M. at 480, 745 P.2d at 388 (Stowers, H., dissenting).
14. Silva, 106 N.M. at 473, 745 P.2d at 381. The court also reviewed the respondeat superior issue.
See supra note 2. Accepting the rationale of Abalos v. Bernalillo County Dist. Attorney's Office, 105 N.M.
554, 734 P.2d 794 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 106 N.M. 35, 738 P.2d 907 (1987), the Silva court held
that -[a] governmental entity is not immune from liability for any tort of its employee acting within the
scope of duties for which immunity is waived tby the Tort Claims Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§41-4-1 to -29
(Repl. Pamp. 1986 & Cum. Supp. 1987)]." iSilva. 106 N.M. at 477, 745 P.2d at 385. Thus, direct actions
"
may lie against a city or state entity having nmediate supervisory responsibilities" over a negligent public
employee who meets one of the sovereign immunity waiver exceptions under the act. Id., quoting Abalos,
105 N.M. at 559, 734 P.2d at 799.
15. Id. at 474, 745 P.2d at 382. Resjudicata, or claim preclusion, requires among other things that the
cause of action in the second suit be the same as in the first suit before the doctrine will act as a bar. Id.,
citing Three Rivers Land Co. v. Maddoux, 98 N.M. 690, 652 P.2d 240 (1982). In Silva, the court noted
that although the same course of conduct was involved in both actions, the duty sued upon stemmed from
"different roots", and thus the same cause of action requirement was not met. 106 N.M. at 474, 745 P.2d
at 382 (citing Adams v. United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO, 97 N.M. 369, 640 P.2d 475 (1982)).
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collateral estoppel. 6 Beyond its ultimate holding, however, the significance of
the opinion is its emphatic dicta announcing a new law of collateral estoppel for
New Mexico.' 7
Collateral estoppel, Justice Ransom posited, will be available to plaintiffs or
defendants seeking to preclude relitigation of an issue so long as the party against
whom the doctrine is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue
in a prior proceeding and it would not otherwise be unfair.1t In rejecting the
traditional doctrine requiring same parties or privity, the court relied heavily on
ParklaneHosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 9 the seminal federal case on the modern
collateral estoppel doctrine.'
III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

A. Background
Collateral estoppel, as Judge Learned Hand put it, "is very old law." 2' Sometimes analyzed as a subset of resjudicata22 collateral estoppel is better conceived24
of as a distinct doctrine23 having a common basis in the judicial goal of finality.
16. 106 N.M. at 476, 745 P.2d at 384. The court was unable to discern the precise rationale behind the
lower courts' rejection of plaintiffs' collateral estoppel argument. Id. Nonetheless, because the Duran court
"did not actually and necessarily make a final determination that any failure of defendants . . . was a
proximate cause of Silva's death," the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed. Id.
17. Despite its being technically dicta, the mandatory tone (e.g., "we hold . . .")and extent of the
court's analysis undoubtedly will prevail upon the lower courts to proceed using the modern version of
collateral estoppel doctrine according to the principles stated in Silva. In fact, the Silva rulealready has
been applied in the recent case of Reeves v. Wimberly, 27 N.M. B. BULL. 332, 333 (Ct. App. April 28,
1988). See also infra nn. 65-66 and accompanying text.
18. 106 N.M. at 476, 745 P.2d at 384.
19. 439 U.S. 322 (1979). Parklane Hosiery involved a stockholders' class action against various defendants against whom the Securities and Exchange Commission had previously won a non-jury decision
that the defendants had issued a materially false and misleading proxy statement. As in Silva, the plaintiffs
in the second action raised collateral estoppel in a partial summary judgment motion. The district court
denied the motion and the Second Circuit reversed. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit,
holding that collateral estoppel applied and that its application did not deny the defendants their seventh
amendment right to a jury trial. Id.
20. The Silva court also cited Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Illinois Fund, 402 U.S. 313
(1971) as an example of the use of modern collateral estoppel by a defendant. 106 N.M. at 475, 745 P.2d
at 383. In Blonder-Tongue, a plaintiff attempted to bing a patent infringement suit even though its patent
had been declared invalid in a prior suit against a different defendant. The U.S. Supreme Court, after an
extensive discussion of the criticisms levied against the doctrine of mutuality, see infra notes 38-41 and
accompanying text, held that the plaintiff was estopped from relitigating the validity of its patent.
21. Irving National Bank v. Law, 10 F.2d 721, 724 (2d Cir. 1926). See also Justice Field's review of
the early English and American authorities in Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876). For a
fascinating discussion comparing the historical roots of collateral estoppel and resjudicata,see Millar, The
HistoricalRelation of Estoppel by Record to Res Judicata, 35 N.W.U.L. REV. 41 (1940). According to
Millar, collateral estoppel has its roots in the Germanic legal tradition, whereas resjudicata has separate
origins in Roman law.
22. See, e.g., Polasky, CollateralEstoppel-Effects of Prior Litigation, 39 IowA L. REv. 217 (1954);
United States v. Silliman, 167 F.2d 607, 620-21 (3d Cir.), cert. denied. 335 U.S. 825 (1948); Purter v.
Heckler, 771 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1985).
23. This distinction between res judicata and collateral estoppel was made in the early case Cromwell
v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876). New Mexico also explicitly recognizes the distinction. See Edwards
v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 102 N.M. 396, 400, 696 P.2d 484, 488 (Ct. App. 1985) (citing
Parklane Hosiery). See also Millar, supra note 21.
24. See Edwards, 102 N.M. at 400, 696 P.2d at 488 (citing Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 326; Smith
v. Updegraff, 744 F.2d 1354 (8th Cir. 1984); Delgue v. Curutchet, 677 P.2d 208 (Wyo. 1984); lB J. Moore,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.405111, 180 (2d ed. 1988)).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

Whereas res judicata bars a litigant from bringing any part of the same cause
of action in a second lawsuit, collateral estoppel bars relitigation of identical
issues subsequently raised by different causes of action.' Thus, in keeping the
two doctrines straight, resjudicataand collateral estoppel frequently are referred
to as "claim preclusion" and "issue preclusion" respectively.26
1. The Elements of Collateral Estoppel
Before collateral estoppel will preclude relitigation of an issue, certain fundamental conditions must be met. First, the same issue sought to be barred must
have arisen from a different cause of action in the prior suit." Second, the issue
must previously have been actually litigated.28 Third, in the prior action the issue
must necessarily have been decided.29 Fourth, the prior decision of the issue
must have been part of a final judgment. 3
25. Silva, 106 N.M. at 474, 745 P.2d at 382.
26. This terminology apparently was first coined by Vestal, The Constitution and PreclusionlRes Judicata,
62 MICH. L. REv. 33, 34 (1963), though courts had used "preclusion" for some time. That the term "'issue
preclusion" has become common parlance is indicated by its use in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS,
§27 (1982).
27. Torres v. Village of Capitan, 92 N.M. 64. 582 P.2d 1277 (1978). This first element represents the
chief distinction between collateral estoppel and its close relative, resjudicata.See International Paper Co.
v. Farrar, 102 N.M. 739, 741, 700 P.2d 642, 644-45 (1985). Where the cause of action was the same in
the prior suit, all issues which were or might have been adjudicated "merge" with the prior judgment and
become barred by resjudicatawhen that same cause of action is attempted again. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS §§45, 47 (1982). Collateral estoppel, on the other hand, applies by definition to identical
issues adjudicated in the context of separate causes of action that-as Judge L. Hand pointed out--"may
be as different as possible." Irving Nat'l Bank v. Law, 10 F.2d 721, 724 (2d Cir. 1926). In the context of
Silva for example, the issue whether defendants were remiss in their duties arose first in an action to ensure
compliance with the Duran consent decree, and subsequently in the context of the wrongful death action
on behalf of Silva's estate. Silva, 106 N.M. at 479, 745 P.2d at 387 (C.). Scarborough, dissenting). Thus,
the Silva court correctly concluded that the issue presented was one of collateral estoppel, not resjudicata.
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
Determining whether causes of action are the same such that resjudicata rather than collateral estoppel
applies is frequently a difficult task. Since 1982, the "transaction" test in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS §24 (1982) has been used for making this threshold determination. See Occhialino, Walden's
Civil Procedure, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel, at 12-30 to 12-34 (2d ed. 1988) for a description
of the "transaction" test. It is important to note that even where the transaction test is otherwise met, each
cause of action against different defendants not in privity with each other constitutes a separate claim for
purposes of preclusion law. Id. at §IV.A. (citing Adams as illustrative).
28. Torres, 92 N.M. 64, 582 P.2d 1277. A key distinction between resjudicataand collateral estoppel
is that, whereas the resjudicatanotion of "merger and bar" operates to preclude issues which could have
been raised under a cause of action but were not, collateral estoppel will never effect a preclusion of
unlitigated issues. See Romero v. State, 97 N.M. 569, 572, 642 P.2d 172, 175 (1982); see also supra note
27 and Moore, supra note 24, at 0.443131, 768-73. At the same time, collateral estoppel will preclude
issues in subsequent lawsuits which resjudicata will not bar as a result of their arising in a different cause
of action.
In assessing whether an issue was actually litigated, courts will not hesitate to look to the pleadings in
the prior suit. See, e.g., Henderson v. Snider Bros., Inc., 409 A.2d 1083, 1088 (D.C. App. 1979). Note
too that Rule 15B, Fed. R. Civ. P., and its state counterpart, SCRA 1986, 1-015B, permit the litigation
of issues not raised by the pleadings themselves. Thus, where contested issues develop and the pleadings
are not subsequently cured by the parties, a court's attention should be directed to the transcript or other
relevant record of proceeding. The actual litigation element is discussed further infra at note 29.
-29. Torres, 92 N.M. 64,582 P.2d 1277. By employing the language "actually and necessarily decided",
some New Mexico cases have blurred the distinction between the actual litigation requirement, discussed
supra note 28, and the necessarily decided requirement. See, e.g., Silva, 106 N.M. at 474, 745 P.2d at
382; Edwards, 102 N.M. at 400, 696 P.2d at 488; but see International Paper Co. v. Farrar, 102 N.M.
739, 741-42, 700 P.2d 642, 644-45 (1985). To meet the latter requirement, an issue must not only have
been decided, but also must have been necessary to the outcome.
The necessarily decided element is analytically distinct from the actually litigated element. For example,
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The fifth and final basic requirement-concerning the extent to which the
parties or their privies must overlap between the first and second suits-is the
point of divergence between the traditional and modern rules of collateral estoppel. 3 Under the traditional rule which Silva rejected, but which is still in
effect in some jurisdictions, both litigants had to have been parties or in privity
with parties in the prior lawsuit.32 Under the modern rule, however, only the
plaintiff or defendant against whom issue preclusion is asserted must have been
a party or in privity on the prior occasion. 33 Thus, collateral estoppel under the
modern rule may be asserted by complete strangers to the first action.3
2. Mutuality Under Fire
The traditional rule that both parties had to be the same or in privity with the
parties in the prior suit developed under the doctrine of mutuality." Mutuality
restricts collateral estoppel. Under the mutuality doctrine it was considered unfair
for a litigant to invoke preclusion unless in the prior action that same litigant
risked being bound had the outcome gone the other way.36 The mutuality, simply
put, was that of shared risk. Professor Moore notes that the mutuality requirement
is basically a restatement of the principle that in personamjudgments only settle
the rights of the parties inter se and do not determine truth for the world.37
a court may appear to have necessarily decided a point that was never actually put in issue or argued by
the parties. E.g., Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. George F. McCourt Trucking, Inc., 277 F.2d 593 (5th Cir.
1960) (extrinsic evidence revealed that point on which collateral estoppel was asserted had not actually
been contested by the parties). Conversely, parties may heatedly contest an issue which the court never
really resolves, as where a court assumes but does not decide a point. In each of these circumstances
collateral estoppel should be inapplicable because the underlying purpose of the doctrine is to prevent
parties from relitigating issues which have been finally resolved by a court. Adams, 97 N.M. 369, 640
P.2d 475.
Further, it is clear that a court may actually decide an issue without its decision being necessary to the
judgment rendered; in this case collateral estoppel does not apply. Paulos v. Janetakos, 46 N.M. 390, 393,
129 P.2d 636 (1942). For a discussion of Paulos and the traditional distinction between "ultimate facts"
and "evidentiary facts", see Occhialino, supra note 27, at 12-49 to 12-52. It is also clear that a court may
necessarily decide an issue without saying it is doing so; in this case collateral estoppel would apply.
Fayerweather v. Ritch, 195 U.S. 276 (1904).
Determining whether a prior court necessarily decided an issue can likewise be complicated when a court
rests its holding on alternative bases. See generally Lucas, The Direct and Collateral Estoppel Effects of
Alternative Holdings, 50 U. CHm.L. REV. 701 (1983); Malloy v. Trombley, 50 N.Y.2d 46, 427 N.Y.S.2d
969, 405 N.E.2d 213 (1980). Another difficulty lies in determining whether a consent judgment implies a
determination of issues; the prevailing view is that it should not. Hentschel v. Smith, 278 Minn. 86, 153
N.W.2d 199 (1967); see generally James, Consent Judgments as Collateral Estoppel, 108 U. PA. L. REV.
173 (1959); also cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §27, comment (e) (1982) (regarding effects
of admissions in pleadings); Costilla Estates Dev. Co. v. Mascarenas, 33'N.M. 356, 360-61, 267 P. 74,
75-76 (1927) (regarding effects of stipulations between parties).
30. Silva, 106 N.M. at 474, 745 P.2d at 382 (citing C & H Const. & Paving Co. v. Citizens Bank, 93
N.M. 150, 160-61, 597 P.2d 1190, 1200-01 (Ct. App. 1979)). In C & H Const., the court noted that "[ilt
is well established that the doctrines of resjudicata and collateral estoppel apply only to final judgments."
93 N.M. at 160, 597 P.2d at 1200 (citations omitted). The trial court had granted a summary judgment
motion to defendants based on the asserted preclusive effect of an order appointing a receiver. The court
of appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment because such an order is not final. Id. at 161, 597 P.2d
at 1201.
31. Moore, supra note 24, at 0.44112], 724-25.
32. Torres, 92 N.M. 64, 582 P.2d 1277.
33. Silva, 106 N.M. at 474, 745 P.2d at 382.
34. Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. 313.
35. Silva, 106 N.M. at 474, 745 P.2d at 382.
36. Id. (quoting Edwards, 102 N.M. at 401, 696 P.2d at 489 (1974)).
37. Moore, supra note 24, at 0.4413--21, 73 1.
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Over time, the mutuality doctrine as applied in the context of collateral estoppel-despite its pleasing symmetry-became the subject of increasing criticism by courts and commentators alike. 38 Critics attacked the doctrine as "destitute
of any semblance of reason, and as 'a maxim which one would suppose to have
39
found its way from the gaming-table to the bench."' The chief problem with
the mutuality doctrine is that it operated to permit litigants to rehash issues which
they had already lost, albeit to different adverse parties.' Thus, critics urged,
rather than promote the underlying purposes of collateral estoppel, the doctrine
of mutuality actually undermines judicial finality and wastes the resources of the
courts and the parties.4"

3. Transition to the Modem Rule
A host of exceptions developed to mitigate the impact of strict adherence to
mutuality in certain instances." For example, an indemnitee could assert collateral estoppel even though not a party in a prior action which absolved the
43
indemnitor of liability based on a finding that the indemnitee was not negligent.
Likewise, an employer could preclude a third party's respondeatsuperiortheory
where the third party had lost a prior suit against the employee." Courts justified
5
other exceptions to mutuality in the context of similar special relationships."
have
many
because
These exceptions have more than just historical significance
found a home in the collateral estoppel doctrine under the rubric of "privity",
38. See the discussion of the mutuality doctrine's detractors in Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 32327.
39. Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 954 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964)

(Judge Friendly quoting 3 1. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL
7 WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 171 (J. Bowring ed. 1843)).

EVIDENCE

579 (1827), reprinted in

40. For example, Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 (1936), held that a prior determination of
patent invalidity did not preclude the patentee from asserting the validity of the patent in a later suit
against a different defendant. Id. at 642. Triplett was explicitly overruled on that point by BlonderTongue, 402 U.S. at 350.
41. Of course, if an opposite result obtains on the issue the second time it is raised, it would be
difficult to convince the prior loser that he or she wasted resources.
42. See generally Moore, supra note 24, at 0.441[3.-21, 732-34.
43. Brobston v. Darby, 290 Pa. 331, 138 A. 849 (1927). The Brobston court justified the exception
"'by the injustice which would result in allowing a recovery against a defendant for conduct of
another, when that other has been exonerated in a direct action.'" Id. at 333, 138 A. at 851 (quoting
34 C.J. Judgments § 1407, pp. 988-89 (1924)).
44. Tighe v. Skillings, 297 Mass. 504, 9 N.E.2d 532 (1937); see also Spector v. El Ranco, Inc.,
263 F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1959) (prior unsuccessful suit against employer precluded recovery from
employee).
45. See, e.g., Good Health Dairy Prod. Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14, 9 N.E.2d 758 (1937)
(automobile owner and driver); Reeves v. Wimberly, 27 N.M. B. BULL. 332 (Ct. App. April 28,
1988) (lessor and lessee); McCourt v. Algiers, 4 Wis. 2d 607, 91 N.W.2d 194 (1956) (insurer and
insured); Overstreet v. Thomas, 239 S.W.2d 939 (Ky. 1951) (principal and agent).Even the broadening of the traditional privity inquiry from whether there is "mutual or successive relationship[s]
to the same rights of property" to whether the relationship is "sufficiently close" can be attributed
to the desire to circumvent the harshness of unflagging devotion to identity of parties. See Comment,
Collateral Estoppel Without Mutuality: Accepting the Bernhard Doctrine, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1423,
1438 (1982) (hereinafter Vanderbilt Comment) (quoting S. GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 523, at 656 (16th ed. 1899), and, Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Parties,
50 IOWA L. REV. 27, 45 (1964)).
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some degree of which apparently survives the Silva court's adoption of the
modem rule.'
The mounting criticism47 and erosion 48 of mutuality inevitably resulted in
complete abandonment in the landmark California case of Bernhard v. Bank of
America,"9 where Judge Traynor took it upon himself to "extirpate the mutuality
requirement and put it to the torch." 50 Dramatic as that sounds, Bernhardsimply
modified the requirement of identity extending to both parties so that only the
one party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted need have been a party
or in privity in the earlier suit." The real drama is the extent to which Traynor's
flame has engulfed American jurisdictions. Other states, starting with New York52
46. The Silva court replaces the "same parties" element with the requirement that "'the party
against whom estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate." 106 N.M. at
, 745
P.2d at 382 (emphasis added). Other language of the opinion, however, suggests the notion of privity
still lingers under the modem formulation: "A growing number of jurisdictions hold that, absent
fundamental unfairness in a given case, the doctrine of collateral estoppel may be applied against
parties or their privies to both suits regardless of whether the party asserting the doctrine was privy
to the first suit." (Emphasis added.) Id. See also ParklaneHosiery, 439 U.S. 322. "Privity" is a
conclusory label. The doctrine of privity has become crowded with relationships justified as exceptions
designed to prevent strict mutuality from working a windfall second chance to losing litigants. That
rationale, however, may only apply to justify expanding privity to permit more asserters of collateral
estoppel, not more persons against whom assertion should be permitted. Thus, to the extent New
Mexico may be encouraged to subscribe to an expanded privity concept, courts must take care to
remain within the bounds of due process in future cases. Where those against whom collateral
estoppel is asserted were not themselves parties in the prior action, the asserting party has the burden
to establish prima facie that due process is satisfied in the sense that the new party was bound by
the prior determination of the issue. See Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n., 19
Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
47. See supra nn. 38-41 and accompanying text.
48. See supra nn. 42-46 and accompanying text.
49. Bernhard, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892. Bernhard involved litigation over the will of Clara
Sather. In the first action beneficiaries objected in probate court to an accounting made by the
executor of the will, but the probate court found Sather had made an inter vivos gift of money to
the executor. When the executor subsequently resigned, the new administratrix, Berhard, sued the
bank from which the first executor had withdrawn the money, alleging Sather never authorized the
withdrawal. The California Supreme Court affirmed a trial court ruling permitting the bank-a nonparty in thii probate action-to preclude Bernhard from denying the earlier finding of an inter vivos
gift. Id.
50. This now-famous phrase was the characterization of Professor Currie. Currie, Civil Procedure:
The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 25, 26 (1965).
51. Some commentators would expand the availability of collateral estoppel even farther than
Bernhard did. See articles cited in Pielemeier, Due Process Limitations on the Application of
CollateralEstoppel Against Nonparties to PriorLitigation, 63 B.U.L. REv. 383, 384 n. I (1983).
In general, these commentators advocate permitting the assertion of collateral estoppel even against
nonparties or traditional privies where, for example, the particular interest was adequately represented
in the prior suit. See, e.g., Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion:Expansion, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 357
(1974). This view has had little success in the courts. But see Vulcan, Inc. v. Fordees Corp., 658
F.2d 1106 (6th Cir. 1981) ("[flederal courts are no longer bound by rigid definitions of the parties
or their privies for purposes of applying res judicata or collateral estoppel."); Aerojet-General Corp.
v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 908 (1975) (preclusion justified by "virtual
representation"). The underlying policy rationale is basically one of efficiency, consistency, and
finality. The problem with these "expansionist" arguments, as Pielemeier points out, resides in the
due process clauses of the United States Constitution. See Pielemeier, supra this note. See also the
discussion of expansionist rules proposed to avoid due process problems, infra note 78.
52. Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., I N.Y.2d 116, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1, 134 N.E.2d 97 (1956). A later
New York court ended any doubts when it remarked "the 'doctrine of mutuality' is a dead letter."
B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 147, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 601, 225 N.E.2d 195, 198
(1967).
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and Wisconsin,53 began to join the Bernhard bandwagon. Federal courts of
appeals, beginning with the Third' and Second55 Circuits, also followed suit.
By the time of the Silva opinion, what the court characterized as "a growing
number of jurisdictions" 56 already included the entire federal judiciary and a
solid majority of the states.57
The United States Supreme Court adopted the modem rule of collateral estoppel in two seminal cases decided at each end of the last decade. In BlonderTongue Laboritories,Inc. v. University of Illinois Found.9," the Court catalogued60
Bernhard,
various criticisms of the strict mutuality requirement," discussed
and concluded that collateral estoppel should be permitted as an affirmative
defense by a new defendant "against a party who has already litigated an issue
62
once and lost." 6' In Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, the Court went one
step further by allowing a new plaintiff to assert collateral estoppel offensively
against a party who had "received a 'full and fair' opportunity to litigate" the
issue on a prior occasion. 63 Taken together, Blonder-Tongue and ParklaneHosiery
form a textbook on the modem collateral estoppel doctrine, and they signal the
triumph'M of the Bernhard rule over the time-honored mutuality tradition in
American jurisprudence.
Viewed against this background, New Mexico basically has joined the crowd.
The Silva court went well out of its way to make this pronouncement:
53. McCourt, 4 Wis. 2d 607, 91 N.W.2d 194.
54. Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950).
55. Adriaanse v. United States, 184 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 932 (1951).
56. 106 N.M. at 474, 745 P.2d at 382.
57. For a slightly dated listing of states which have accepted some form of the modem collateral
estoppel rule, see Vanderbilt Comment, supra note 45, at 1423 n.8. In addition to the 23 states
there listed, at least seven others have applied a version of the modem rule as of this writing. See
P.X. Restaurant, Inc. v. Town of Windsor, 189 Conn. 153, 454 A.2d 1258 (1983); Shea v. Bader,
102 Idaho 697, 638 P.2d 894 (1981); Phelan v. Lee Blaine Enter., 716 P.2d 601 (Mont. 1986); Silva
v. State, 106 N.M. 472, 745 P.2d 380 (1987); Derry Township School Dist. v. Day & Zimmerman,
Inc., 345 Pa.Super. 487, 498 A.2d 928 (1985); Cole v. Charron, 477 A.2d 959 (R.I. 1984); Baxter
v. Utah Dept. of Transp., 705 P.2d 1167 (Utah 1985). The collateral estoppel law of other jurisdictions
becomes important because of the general rule that courts should apply the preclusion law of the
forum where the prior suit relied on was litigated. See generally Occhialino, supra note 27, at 1256 to 12-58.
58. See supra note 20.
59. 402 U.S. at 318-29.
60. Id. at 323-25, 349.
61. Id. at 349.
62. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
63. 439 U.S. at 332.
64. The modern rule is not without its detractors, and many states still cling to the mutuality
doctrine. Mutuality is defended on plausible grounds beyond the mere desire for symmetry in the
identity of parties requirement. First, mutuality is defended as a device to prevent an unfair allocation
of risks between a bound party who might suffer multiple liability absent mutuality, and the winning
party who risks nothing even had the case been lost. See Greenebaum, In Defense of the Doctrine
of Mutuality of Estoppel, 45 IND. L.J. 1 (1969). Second, mutuality stems from "general principles"
of our legal system that parties should only risk loss of rights or liability with reference to an in
personam adversary. See Seavey, Res Judicata With Reference to Persons Neither Parties Nor
Privies-Two CaliforniaCases, 57 HARV. L. REV. 98, 105 (1943). Third, in recognition of the fact
that our judicial system is not infallible, mutuality prevents nonparties from compounding incorrect
determinations. See Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35 TUL. L. REV.
301 (1961). These and other arguments favoring mutuality are addressed in the Vanderbilt Comment,
supra note 45.
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[W]e hold that the doctrine of defensive collateral estoppel may be applied
when a defendant seeks to preclude a plaintiff from relitigating an issue the
plaintiff has previously litigated and lost regardless of whether [the] defendant was privy to the prior suit; and that the doctrine of offensive collateral
estoppel may be applied when a plaintiff seeks to foreclose the defendant
from litigating an issue the defendant has previously litigated unsuccessfully
regardless of whether plaintiff was privy to the prior action. 5
By this and other language of its opinion the Silva court apparently' has abandoned the traditional mutuality requirement and adopted the modem rule of
collateral estoppel.
B. The Requirements of the Modern Rule
Apart from the pre-existing elements requiring (1) the same issue67 to have
been (2) actually litigated6" and (3) necessarily decided69 in (4) a final judgment"
in the prior action, the Silva opinion requires (5) that the party "against whom
estoppel is asserted has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate."'" Silva
continues to recognize that "it is the burden of the movant . . . to introduce
72
sufficient evidence for the court to rule whether the doctrine is applicable."
65. 106 N.M. at 476, 745 P.2d at 384. A few observations about these important dicta are worth
noting here. First, while defensive collateral estoppel typically will be asserted by a defendant,
plaintiffs too can be put in the position of defensively asserting, as where the issue sought to be
precluded is raised initially by a Rule 13 counterclaim of a defendant or even by a cross-claim of
a co-plaintiff. By the same token, offensive collateral estoppel could be raised by a defendant in the
context of a counterclaim against the plaintiff or a cross-claim against a co-defendant. Thus, while
acceptable as shorthand, this passage oversimplifies the offensive-plaintiff and defensive-defendant
relationships.
Second, the phrases "litigated and lost" and "litigated unsuccessfully" are not altogether helpful
to analysis because they overly restrict the number of issues which might ultimately be estopped.
As a practical matter, in the civil arena who wins or loses is often unclear and subject to debate.
Even where the outcome is clear, however, there appears to be nothing to prevent preclusion of a
winning party who-happy at the time of victory-attempts subsequently to rehash an issue actually
litigated and necessarily decided. Again, while the passage might be descriptive of the typical estoppel
situation, these phrases tend to oversimplify and thereby frustrate understanding.
Third, in the debate over whether this passage intends to establish new law for New Mexico, see
supra note 17 and accompanying text, the court had little reason to cast this in the form of a holding
if it were merely restating the federal law which the Edwards rationale recognizes as the applicable
law where the first action relied on for estoppel was a federal decision. Blonder-Tongue and Parklane
Hosiery, as the Silva court noted later in its opinion, had already clearly established the availability
of both defensive and offensive collateral estoppel some years before.
66. See supra nn. 17 & 65.
67. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
68. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
71. 106 N.M. at 476, 745 P.2d at 384.
72. Id. (citing International Paper Co. v. Farrar, 102 N.M. 739, 700 P.2d 642 (1985)). This
statement admits of at least two interpretations. The beginning of the sentence reads: "Neither the
offensive or defensive use of collateral estoppel is to be applied where the record is insufficient to
determine what issues were actually and necessarily determined by prior litigation ..... Id. (citing
Howell v. Anaya, 102 N.M. 583, 698 P.2d 453 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 102 N.M. 613, 698 P.2d
886 (1985)). The complete sentence suggests the possibilty that only the first four elements comprise
the movant's burden, and that the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to show a lack of full and
fair opportunity to litigate by proving either that the nonmovant was not a party or privy to the prior
suit, or that, even if a party or privy, circumstances of the case were such that collateral estoppel
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Once the movant has made a primafacie showing of the five elements noted
to the nonmovant, who may rebut by arguing that
above, Silva shifts the burden
"countervailing equities" 73 are such that the court should excercise its discretionary power to avoid application because it would be "unfair"." Thus, there
are actually two components to the Silva rule, and those are discussed separately
below.
1. Full and Fair Opportunity to Litigate
The full and fair opportunity element springs from the fundamental due process
notion that a person should have his or her "day in court"." Unfortunately, that
phrase is almost as ineffective in providing collateral estoppel with a conceptual
framework as it is in describing the duration of typical litigation. Nonetheless,
76
it helps to note that-once collateral estoppel is stripped of mutuality -the
policies77 underlying the doctrine are cast in direct opposition to fundamental
values potected by due process, and it ultimately is the challenge of courts to
resolve the policy tension.78
would be fundamentally unfair. Under this interpretation, the court's list of "countervailing equities",
see infra nn. 82-104 and accompanying text, go directly to the issue of whether the nonmovant had
a full and fair opportunity. Support for this reading might be found in comparing the court's statement
that "[flundamental fairness requires .. .a full and fair opportunity to litigate," id. at 474, 745
P.2d at 382, with a later statement that "[ulnfaimess was discussed as arising where [countervailing
equities exist]," id. at 475, 745 P.2d at 383.
Another view, however, is that the movant bears the burden of also proving that the nonmovant
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate. First, the traditional element requiring same parties or
privity was a part of the movant's burden in the Farrar case which Silva cites, and since the dual
identity of parties required under mutuality was basically modified by Silva to require only singular
identity of the party against whom estoppel is asserted, it is logical to leave the remnant as part of
the movant's burden. Second, because collateral estoppel is not applicable against litigants wholly
unrelated to parties in the first action, the movant cannot have made a prima facie showing unless
and until showing that the party against whom estoppel is asserted sufficiently appeared in, or behind
the scenes of, the prior action. Such a showing actually involves a two-fold burden. The movant
must show both that the nonmovant had a sufficient presence in the prior action and that the party
who actually litigated earlier-whether or not it was the nonmovant-had a full and fair opportunity
to litigate when and where it was litigated.
Under this latter view, "countervailing equities" involve an inquiry somewhat distinct from that
of the full and fair opportunity element. Countervailing equities are just what their name implies,
i.e., considerations which might countervail the equity of collateral estoppel despite the fact that a
full and fair opportunity was had once before. The trap lies in the infusion of both inquiries with
notions of fairness. The use by the Silva court of the terms "fundamental fairness" and "fairness"
confuses matters, but if one reads "fundamental fairness" to be the due process term of art it is,
and "fairness" or "unfairness" to mean "equity" or "inequity", the confusion might disappear. It
is thus useful to think of the movant's burden to show full and fair opportunity as flowing directly
from constitutional due process, while the nonmovant's ability to raise countervailing equities to
overcome a successful prima facie case is in recognition of the fact that collateral estoppel itself is
an equitable doctrine ofjudicial creation over which judges have traditionally had broad discretionary
powers.
73. 106 N.M. at 476, 745 P.2d at 384. See infra nn. 82-104 and accompanying text.
74. Id.
75. See generally Pielemeier, supra note 51.
76. See supra nn. 82-104 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
78. Some courts have developed lists of factors to consider in assessing whether a litigant had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate. For example, in Perez v. New York City Housing Auth., 114
Misc.2d 1055, 452 N.Y.S.2d 510 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1982), a case involving nonmutual offensive
collateral estoppel, the court stated:
In determining whether [the party against whom offensive collateral estoppel was
asserted] had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of gross negligence
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To what, then, should litigants direct a court for guidance in ascertaining
whether particular parties have already exhausted their opportunities? In the
paradigm case, where precisely the same party appeared in the same capacity,
extensively litigated the same issue, and was directly bound by the prior judgment, the records of the prior proceeding required to establish actual litigation
and necessary determination should suffice.79 Many cases will arise, however,
where it will be less than entirely clear whether the party to the prior action had
a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, and in these cases the asserting
party's burden will be problematic. In a relatively small number of cases, asserting parties must also establish privity to overcome the general rule that
nonparties had no full and fair opportunity to litigate.' In these cases, the current
law of privity stands as a reservoir of authority for the proposition that certain
nonparties may have had a "vicarious day in court"'" and thus a full and fair
opportunity to litigate.
'the size of the claim, the forum of the prior litigation, the use of initiative, the
extent of the litigation, the competence and experience of counsel, the availability
of new evidence, indications of a compromise verdict, differences in the applicable
law and foreseeabilty of future litigation' must be considered. Schwartz v. Public
Adm'r of County of Bronx, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 72, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 246 N.E.2d
725 (1969).
Id. at 1058, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 513. In both Perez and the Schwartz case it cites, these are factors
which a party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted may raise to show a lack of full and fair
opportunity to litigate. Some of the factors correspond more closely to the "countervailing equities"
part of the Silva formulation, however. Indeed, the factors listed overlap with those listed in Silva.
See infra nn. 82-104 and accompanying text. Those factors appearing in Perez which are not listed
as countervailing considerations by the Silva court suggest themselves as possibilities for argument
by future litigants in New Mexico.
79. New Mexico cases are fairly clear that an adequate record of the prior proceedings should
be presented to invoke collateral estoppel. See cases cited supra note 72.
80. Blonder-Tongue Lab, Inc. v. University of Illinois Fund, 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971), states
the general rule that those who never appeared in a prior action may not be collaterally estopped
without litigating the issue.
81. "Vicarious day in court" is borrowed from Note, CollateralEstoppel ofNonparties, 87 HARv.
L. REv. 1485, 1500 (1974), where the phrase is used to capture the author's "expansionist" rationale
based on adequacy of representation. These expansionist views are discussed supra note 51.
An interesting and significant debate among commentators centers on whether new procedural
rules should be employed to expand availability of preclusion to permit assertion against certain
nonparties. In keeping with the general thrust of the modem civil procedural rules to allow complication of lawsuits in order to achieve efficient resolution of claims, new procedural mechanisms
have been proposed to limit multiple lawsuit inefficiency by capitalizing on the advantages of
preclusion. Largely they are designed to circumvent the due process obstacle. See, e.g., McCoid,
A Single Package for Multiparty Disputes, 28 STAN. L. REv. 707 (1976); Semmel, Collateral
Estoppel, Mutuality and Joinder of Parties, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1457 (1968).
McCoid explores a proposal he calls the "compulsory intervention model". McCoid, supra note
81 at 718-24. The central feature of the model is that persons "with an interest in a transaction
which is the subject of pending litigation" would be notified of the lawsuit and compelled to choose
between intervening or not. Id. at 718. Regardless of the choice made, the resulting judgment would
be binding on that person and others would be allowed to assert preclusion in the event relitigation
is attempted by that person. This model builds on the adequacy of representation theme inherent in
the class action device and is based on the recognition that notice is a key part of any fair opportunity
to be heard required by due process. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306 (1950). McCoid, however, would go one step further toward satisfying due process than some
proponents of legislation based on the model, e.g., Comment, Nonpartiesand Preclusionby Judgment: The PrivityRule Reconsidered, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 1098 (1968); he would require full service
of process to drive home the compulsory nature of the rule. McCoid also recognizes that the reach
of the compulsory intervention model must be limited to those over whom a court could properly
assert personal jurisdiction. Id.
Another commentator prefers an approach to the problem of multiple lawsuits which would make
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2. Countervailing Equities
Assuming the movant asserting collateral estoppel establishes the prima facie
requisites to applicability, 2 Silva invites nonmovants-at least those against
whom collateral estoppel is offensively asserted-to plead to a court's discre83
tionary power not to apply the doctrine. Relying largely on an enumeration in
raise questions about the fairness of
might
which
ParklaneHosiery of situations
preclusion in a particular case," Justice Ransom listed several "countervailing
85
equities" which a trial court "must consider".
could have joined in the earlier
"easily
First, offensive use by a plaintiff who
'
an unfair windfall and be
plaintiff
the
give
might
to
not
but chose
action
counterproductive of the purposes of collateral estoppel. This theory is enunciated
more clearly in Parklane Hosiery, where the Court noted that the prospect of
offensive collateral estoppel creates an incentive for plaintiffs to "wait and see"
how another plaintiff does since they will have "everything to gain and nothing
to lose" by staying out of the first action, and this in turn "will likely increase
rather than decrease the total amount of litigation.""
"where a defendant had
Second, offensive collateral estoppel may be unfair
88
little incentive to defend vigorously in the first suit." This would arise where,
for example, small or nominal damages were involved in the first action relative
to the stakes of the second, especially if the second suit was unforseeable at the
time of the first. 89 In Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd.,"' for
example, the lack of prior incentive rationale resulted in a denial of offensive
collateral estoppel in a several million dollar lawsuit where the defendant had
and could
chosen not to appeal an earlier judgment imposing liability of $35,000
9'
decision.
the
of
impact
estoppel
collateral
the
not have forseen
joinder of certain nonparties compulsory. Semmel, supra note 81, at 1471-79, believing the trend
to abandon mutuality "reflects the priority now given to judicial economy in the development of
rules of civil procedure," proposes a rule which in effect would place a burden of choice on the
parties rather than exclusively on the nonparties, as happens under the compulsory intervention
model. Id. at 1471. Semmel's "compulsory joinder rule" essentially would force parties to attempt
available permissive joinder or consolidation devices or suffer the collateral estoppel consequences.
Id. at 1475. Where the parties could not have accomplished joinder or consolidation, Semmel would
disallow nonparties' use of the judgment if they "knew or had reason to know" of the lawsuit and
could have gained entrance through intervention or consolidation. Id. Though Semmel's model is
partly achieved by operation of the ParklaneHosiery principles (Semmel wrote before the Supreme
Court adopted the modem rule), some of the characteristics of his proposal have currency as a
possible means of packaging litigation.
A third possibilty is to broaden mandatory joinder by changing the language or construction of
Rule 19 so that more persons having a potential interest in litigation are considered "indispensable"
parties without whom a lawsuit may not proceed.
82. See supra nn. 67-71 and accompanying text.
83. Silva v. State, 106 N.M. 472, 476, 745 P.2d 380, 384 (1987).
84. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329-31 (1979).
85. 106 N.M. at 476, 745 P.2d at 384.
86. 106 N.M. at 475, 745 P.2d at 383.
87. 439 U.S. at 330 (citing Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal. App. 2d 762, 327 P.2d 11 (1958);
Reardon v. Allen, 88 N.J. Super. 560, 213 A.2d 26 (1965)).
88. 106 N.M. at 475, 745 P.2d at 383.
89. See ParklaneHosiery, 439 U.S. at 330.
90. 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965).
91. Id. at 540-41.
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Third, unfairness also may result "where the judgment relied upon . . . is
itself inconsistent with one or more previous judgments. 92 In Glictronix Corp.
v. American Tel. and Tel. Co.,93 for example, the prior inconsistent judgment
rationale led to a denial of preclusion to a plaintiff who sought to rely on a prior
ruling disallowing the defendants a legal defense where a separate prior holding
granted the defendants the defense under the same circumstances. ' The Glictronix opinion clarifies the rationale by noting that the inconsistency between
the prior judgments should be on the issue sought to be estopped.95
Fourth, offensive estoppel may be unfair "where the second action affords the
defendant procedural opportunities unavailable in the first action that could have
easily caused a different result."' The remaining three countervailing equities
Silva lists are really subset examples of this broader procedural opportunities
rationale. The unfairness of relying on a judgment which the defendant had to
defend against in an inconvenient forum,97 for example, is grounded in the fear
that such things as discovery and the calling of witnesses might have been
hindered.98 Likewise, the presence or absence of a jury-which, unlike Parklane
Hosiery, the Silva court found "not... to be altogether immaterial"--is largely
a procedural matter, notwithstanding the seventh amendment implications. "
Finally, the Silva court's willingness to consider the "use of a special master or
other alternative or administrative dispute resolution techniques in the prior
litigation,"10 ' a consideration not raised in ParklaneHosiery, is undoubtedly out
of concern for the differing procedures involved.
The Silva court expressly stated that its list of possible countervailing equities
is merely exemplary. 02
' As a result, the opportunity apparently exists for litigants
to advance similar considerations or find others already used in outside jurisdictions. Indeed, courts have listed other factors.'0 3 In the end, according to
Silva, the overarching principle which should guide a court's determination
whether or not to apply collateral estoppel in a given case is whether the application "would be fundamentally unfair and would not further the aim of the
,104

doctrine.

C. Some Post-Silva Implications
The adoption of modern collateral estoppel has considerable consequences for
the New Mexico bar. As a general matter, Silva's abandonment of mutuality
frees somewhat the hands of judges and expands the availabilty of collateral
92. 106 N.M. at 475, 745 P.2d at 383.
93. 603 F. Supp. 552 (D.N.J. 1984).
94. Id. at 568-74.
95. Id. at 563.
96. Silva v. State, 106 N.M. 472, 475, 745 P.2d 380, 383 (1987).
97. Id.
98. See ParklaneHosiery, 439 U.S. at 330 n.15.
99. 106 N.M. at 476, 745 P.2d at 384.
100. See supra note 19.
101. 106 N.M. at 476, 745 P.2d at 384.
102. Id.
103. See cases cited supra note 78.
104. 106 N.M. at 474, 745 P.2d at 382.
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estoppel beyond the immediate circle of those whose rights are somehow directly
implicated in a given lawsuit. This liberation, however, is accompanied by
implications which call for an environment of caution. Explored here are just
some of the ramifications for courts, parties and potential litigants.' 5
1. Courts
The key challenges for New Mexico judges after Silva are basically two-fold.
First, it will be necessary to determine against which kinds of individuals collateral estoppel may be asserted.,"'o While one effect of the Silva formulation is
to promote efficiency by permitting strangers to a first action to assert the doctrine, 10 7 courts must decline invitations to expand the offensive and defensive
reaches of the doctrine against individuals who had no day in court, either actually
or in effect.'
Second, it will be necessary for judges to determine under what circumstances
it is appropriate to excercise their historic discretionary powers in applying the
doctrine of collateral estoppel." o9 The discretionary avenue remaining open after
Silva is solely the power to deny any assertions against individuals where countervailing considerations reveal that the application would be inequitable." 0 As
with any developing area of law calling for case by case scrutiny of relevant
considerations, it will become necessary to identify and analyze case factors for
their relative importance in order that they be applied consistently to prevent ad
hoc decisions.
2. Parties
The effects of the broadened availability of collateral estoppel on plaintiffs
and defendants after Silva chiefly will consist of various incentives. Parties will
feel new incentives both in the planning stages and throughout the course of the
litigation, as well as during settlement negotiations.
Plaintiffs will have stronger than usual incentives to join all possible defendants
against whom they have claims involving common issues into a single lawsuit."'
If a plaintiff instead sues serially, an initially unfavorable outcome on an issue
will be usable against him by any other potential defendant against whom the
plaintiff may subsequently bring claims involving the same issue. An initially
favorable outcome, however, will afford the plaintiff no advantageous use of
collateral estoppel, except under circumstances where the plaintiff can meet the
burden of showing that other defendants were privies of the first." 2 Thus, at
105. For an extensive discussion of the implications of the Silva rule in the context of postBartlettcomparative negligence in New Mexico, see Occhialino, The ImpactofNon-mutual Collateral
Estoppel on Tort Litigation Involving Several Liability, N.M.L. REv. (1988).
106. See supra nn. 75-81 and accompanying text.
107. See supra nn. 33-34 and accompanying text.
108. See supra nn. 46 & 51.
109. See supra nn. 84-104 and accompanying text.
110. See supra nn. 82-104 and accompanying text.
111. The typical incentives a plaintiff has to join all possible defendants include the relative
expense of litigating serially and the potential benefits of infighting among defendants.
112. See supra nn. 72 & 80.
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best the plaintiff would have to relitigate the common issue against all non-privy
defendants all over again, while at worst the common issue once lost would be
gone for good.
Defendants may be put in a difficult position after Silva, especially where they
are sued by fewer than all of the claimants potentially having causes of action
involving common issues. If a defendant wins on a common issue to the first
of multiple claimants, that defendant will be unable defensively to assert collateral
estoppel when later sued by plaintiffs who are not in privity with the original
plaintiff. If the defendant loses on the common issue, however, subsequent
plaintiffs may offensively assert estoppel "except in cases where a plaintiff could
easily have joined in the earlier action or where [it] would be unfair" to the
defendant." 3 These prospects create a dilemma for the defendant. First, while
the defendant will have a new incentive to bring into one lawsuit all potential
adversaries, the procedural devices available to accomplish this are limited.' "
Second, whereas the new incentive for plaintiffs to join all defendants generally
strengthens already existing incentives to do so, for defendants the parallel new
incentive clashes with the inherent repulsion to being sued.
Both plaintiffs and defendants will want to use a variety of procedures throughout the course of typical litigation with an eye toward the Silva rule. For example,
the possibility that an opponent may have litigated an issue previously and lost,
while formerly often ascertainable through inquiries directed to one's own client,
should be explored through formal discovery to a greater degree after Silva. If
either party suspects there is a privity relationship between their opponent and
a non-party, steps could be taken to establish advantageous facts for the record. 'S
Parties who anticipate the possibility of relying on collateral estoppel, or the
chance that collateral estoppel might be used against them in the future, should
conduct themselves accordingly in the initial suit. For example, special verdicts
for jury actions serve to better distinguish among issues actually litigated and
necessarily decided." 6 Similarly, findings of fact and conclusions of law in nonjury trials should be proposed with care." 7 On the other hand, either party unsure
about their chances on a weak or unimportant issue which might arise again
should settle, stipulate or admit" 8 to that point less hesitantly than before. Defendants also may want to go out of their way to pad the record with evidence
that other potential claimants not presently in the lawsuit are fully aware of its
existence.
113. Silva, 106 N.M. at 475, 745 P.2d at 383.
114. Apart from the possibility of achieving consolidation of pending lawsuits, a defendant's
ability to force an unwilling claimant into a lawsuit is basically limited to situations where the
claimant is an indispensable party under SCRA 1986, 1-019, or where interpleader is appropriate
under SCRA 1986, 1-022. A plaintiff, on the other hand, being the initial master of claims, may
use the broad permissive joinder rule, SCRA 1986, 1-020.
115. Traditional discovery techniques, for example, may be used to obtain relevant information
which would help subsequently establish a privity relationship.
116. See Occhialino, supra note 27.
117. Id.
118. SCRA 1986, 1-036B, states in part: "Any admission made by a party under this rule is for
the purpose of the pending action only and is not an admission by him for any other purpose nor
may it be used against him in any other proceeding."
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3. Potential Litigants
One probably unintended practical effect of the Silva rule is that it creates
certain incentives for potential litigants to stay completely away from pending
suits involving potential opponents where issues are being decided that might
form the basis of collateral estoppel later. For example, a potential defendant
who for some reason is not named as a codefendant in a pending lawsuit has
everything to gain and nothing to lose by letting the lawsuit run its course. If
the plaintiff loses a common issue the sidelining defendant's ability to later assert
defensive estoppel is a windfall. Even if the plaintiff wins the pending suit, the
potential defendant is in no worse position as a result, assuming no privity. " 9
Thus, as a general rule, potential defendants not joined will have the luxury to
relax and watch.
Potential plaintiffs similarly will want to stay clear of pending lawsuits by
other plaintiffs against a common defendant if similar issues are implicated. This
is so despite the Silva and ParklaneHosiery rationale that led to incorporating
within the modem formulation a disallowance of offensive collateral estoppel to
plaintiffs who "could easily have joined" in the prior action.' 2 The phrase "could
easily have joined" is patently vague and, in any event, clearly descriptive of
less than the universe of plaintiffs who might attempt an offensive use of collateral
estoppel. Thus, while the incentive is not as strong as the analogous incentive
of defendants, plaintiffs too might still have something to gain and nothing to
lose by putting their claims on hold, statute of limitations permitting.
IV. CONCLUSION
New Mexico now has joined the federal judiciary and a majority of states in
applying the modem "against whom" rule of collateral estoppel. The New
Mexico Supreme Court in Silva, finding an unlikely vehicle among the legal
circumstances surrounding the suicide of a state correctional facility inmate,
announced in strong dicta that the traditional doctrine of mutuality has run its
course in this state. In place of the requirement of same parties or privies amidst
the elements of collateral estoppel now stands the Silva rule. Any plaintiff or
defendant may assert collateral estoppel so long as the party against whom it is
asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue as a party or privity
once before. Where the particular circumstances are such that precluding the
issue would be unfair to the party against whom the estoppel is asserted, collateral
estoppel should be denied as a matter of equitable discretion. After Silva, both
offensive and defensive uses of nonmutual collateral estoppel will now begin to
weave their way into the legal fabric of New Mexico, and the full results remain
to be explored.
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